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SYMPOSIUM REVIEW
VIRTUAL PROPERTY AND PERSONHOOD
M. Scott Boonet
Abstract
As virtual worlds have increased in popularity, they have
generated a great deal of interest in the legal community. A number
of legal commentators have discussed property in the context of
virtual worlds. This article specifically discusses the application of
Margaret Jane Radin's personhood theory to virtual world property.
While application of Radin's personhood theory is far from perfect, it
provides useful insight into broader questions of individuals as
persons.
t Associate Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law. I would like to thank the
editors of the Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal for inviting me to present
these ideas at the 2008 symposium.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, virtual worlds have grown both in number and in
population. The emergence of virtual worlds has spawned a great deal
of interest and publicity, in both popular and specialized media. News
articles about the millions of players participating in virtual worlds
such as Second Life and World of Warcraft can be seen on a regular
basis on both general and technology-related news sites.' Specialists
in a variety of academic disciplines have turned their attention to
virtual worlds. The legal academic community has been no exception
to this. Within legal academic discussions, a substantial portion of the
commentary has related to the issue of property rights in things that
'exist' only within virtual worlds. In this article, I seek to add to that
discussion by examining the potential application of a particular
normative theory - Margaret Jane Radin's personhood theory - to
virtual world property.
Part II provides a brief overview of virtual worlds and the early
legal commentary addressing the property rights issue. Part III
provides a description of Radin's personhood theory of property. Part
IV first asks whether virtual world property can be classified as
personal under Radin's theory and secondly, examines the potential
effects of so classifying virtual world property. Finally, Part V
concludes and tries to relate this inquiry to the bigger picture.
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN VIRTUAL WORLD OBJECTS
A. Terminology
As a preliminary matter, several comments about the
terminology I will use may be helpful, particularly where this
terminology may differ somewhat from that used elsewhere. I think it
is more precise to use the term 'virtual world property' in discussions
dealing solely with virtual worlds and to use 'virtual property' in
discussions that are broader than just virtual worlds. In this
1. See, e.g., Press Release, Blizzard Entm't, World of Warcraftv Reaches New
Milestone: 10 Million Subscribers (Jan. 22, 2008),
http://www.blizzard.com/press/080122.shtml; Steve Ranger, Europeans Latch on to 'Second
Life,' CNET NEWS, May 4, 2007, http://www.news.com/Europeans-latch-on-to-Second-
Life/2100-1043_3 -6181431.html?tag=news.3; David Kirkpatrick, Second Life: It's Not a Game,
FORTUNE, Feb. 5, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/02/05/8399120/; Marc Graser,
Habbo Hotel has Hollywood Hopes, VARIETY, Sept. 7, 2007, http://www.variety.com/article/
VR 1117971399.html?categoryid= 1009&cs=l &nid=2567.
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classification, 'virtual world property' is a subclass of 'virtual
property,' a broader class that may include additional types of virtual
property besides virtual world property. In making this distinction, I
am not trying to assert that virtual world property is distinguishable
from other types of virtual property, but rather to define properly the
limited scope I am addressing and thus avoid overreaching in my
arguments without justification.
I also typically distinguish between 'object' and 'property' along
the traditional property theory view that property is an intangible set
of rights with respect to some thing. I use 'property' to refer to the set
of rights and 'object' to refer to that thing to which the rights apply.
Thus, I might say 'property rights in virtual world objects' instead of
saying 'virtual world property' to make it clear I am referring to the
rights aspect and not the object aspect. Making this distinction can be
particularly useful in this area because we may have questions about
both. Within typical situations involving personal property, we do not
have much definitional difficulty understanding both what the thing
or object is and what the rights are. Both are at issue in discussions of
virtual property. What combination of code constitutes a 'virtual
object' and what set of rights are included in the concept of 'virtual
property' are both distinct, if interrelated, issues that need to be
addressed.
Additionally, the virtual/virtual world distinction applies to
objects as well. Thus, virtual world objects are a subclass of virtual
objects. Again, I am not asserting that there are important differences
between virtual world objects and other types of virtual objects, but
rather defining a narrower scope of inquiry.
Herein, I will use the term 'virtual world property' instead of
'virtual world object' for two reasons. First, we are concerned here
with the scope and extent of the relevant property rights rather than
the functional characteristics of the coded virtual object. Second, I do
not want the use of the word 'object' in 'virtual world object' to cause
confusion with respect to the subject/object dichotomy discussed
within the personhood theory. My use elsewhere 2 of the terms 'virtual
object' and 'virtual world object' was not meant to imply that what
was referred to was necessarily an object within the meaning of the
subject/object dichotomy.
2. See M. Scott Boone, Virtual Property, Ubiquitous Computing, and the Displacement
of Property Rights, 4 J. INFO. SOC'Y (forthcoming 2008).
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B. Virtual Worlds
While there is no widely accepted definition of what a virtual
world is, most definitions include some description of a simulated
environment that is shared by multiple users, that is persistent, and
that can be affected by the users. One of the leading experts on virtual
worlds, Richard Bartle, described them in this way:
[They] are implemented by a computer (or a network of
computers) that simulates an environment. Some - but not all - of
the entities in this environment are under the direct control of
individual people. Because several such people can affect the same
environment simultaneously, the world is said to be shared or
multi-user. The environment continues to exist and develop
internally (at least to some degree) even when there are no people
interacting with it; this means that it is persistent.
3
The most popular virtual worlds today simulate three-
dimensional graphical environments with which players can interact
with and with each other. These interactions are mediated by the
players' manipulation of their avatars. Avatars therefore act as the
virtual representations of the players within the virtual world. If one
were to take a snapshot of a typical scene within a virtual world, one
might see a space, say a club or tavern, filled with a number of virtual
people, or avatars. Each individual avatar is under the control of a
different person in the real world sitting somewhere in front of a
computer.4 Each person sees the same scene as other people, although
each might be viewing the scene from a slightly different point of
view. If one person, through their avatar, alters some part of the
environment, the other players would observe that change. Thus, the
space in virtual worlds is shared. Further, if one person logs out of the
virtual world, the space remains for the other individuals and can still
be altered by them. As the space continues to exist (at least virtually)
after the person exits, it is persistent.
Virtual worlds can be divided into structured virtual worlds and
unstructured virtual worlds.5 In structured worlds, players' avatars are
often chosen from a small number of highly defined roles. Activities
within structured worlds tend to be strongly oriented by the virtual
3. RicHARD A. BARTLE, DESIGNING VIRTUAL WORLDS 1 (2004).
4. This is the most common circumstance. In some instances, a single person might be
controlling more than one avatar, and in other instances, a virtual representation that otherwise
resembles an avatar may in fact be a bot being controlled by the computers controlling the
virtual world.
5. This dichotomy could also be conceived of as a continuum.
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world developers. While a player may have great freedom in the
actions his avatar takes, the goals towards which those actions are
aimed tend to be provided by the developer. Additionally, in a
structured world, the virtual environments and the virtual objects
within the world are defined and created by the developers. In
contrast, unstructured virtual worlds provide much less definition.
There are typically no roles assigned to avatars, and few goals
provided by the virtual world developers. The roles in which avatars
place themselves are left up to the players. Further, most of the
content from virtual environments to virtual objects is created by the
players and not the virtual world developers.
Virtual worlds can also be divided into game worlds and social
worlds.6 In game worlds, players compete against the other players
and against the environment to attain certain predefined goals. This is
not meant to imply that social interaction does not take place within
game worlds or that such interaction is not important. In fact, social
interaction and social coordination are very important in most game
worlds. While such interaction and coordination can in and of
themselves be goals of the players, it is much more likely that the
social interaction and coordination serve as a means to achieve the
goals of the game. In social worlds, the goals of play are less defined,
and the emphasis is on interaction with other players and with the
environment.7
There is a large degree of overlap between these two
classifications: structured and unstructured, game and social. Game
worlds are almost exclusively highly structured virtual worlds. World
of Warcraft8 provides an example of the current paradigm of a highly
structured game world.9 Social worlds tend to be unstructured worlds,
but the extent to which they are unstructured can vary quite a bit.
Second Life1 ° is a paradigmatic example of an unstructured social
world. The virtual world There"I is a slightly less unstructured social
6. Again, this dichotomy could also be conceived of as a continuum.
7. Interaction with the environment occurs primarily in the form of creating content
within the environment.
8. World of Warcraft, Community Site, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/index.xml
(last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
9. These games are often referred to as Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing
Games, or MMORPG's. See Wikipedia, Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massivelymultiplayer-online-role-playinggame (as of Apr. 23,
2008, 21:47 GMT).
10. Second Life, http://secondlife.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
11. There, http://www.there.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
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world, while Habbo Hotel 12 and Club Penguin 3 are social worlds that
are decidedly more structured than either There or Second Life. The
added structure in these worlds derives primarily from the lack of
ability to create content and to a much lesser extent from the presence
of preset goals.
In these worlds, players can acquire a variety of virtual world
objects. These objects can range from clothing or armor for their
avatar, to tools for use by their avatar, to virtual real estate. In
structured game worlds, and to a lesser extent in unstructured social
worlds, these objects are rivalrous. That is, only one player-avatar can
make use of a given virtual world object at a particular time, and if
one player transfers the virtual world object to another player, then
the first player does not retain a copy. Making virtual world objects
rivalrous increases the sense of a shared world. Maintaining the rarity
of rivalrous objects also allows the virtual world operators to provide
players with goals for game-play - namely the acquisition of such
objects. Additionally, particularly within structured game worlds,
avatars themselves can, through game-play, gain increased abilities to
act within and to affect the virtual world. Both the acquisition (and
retention) of virtual world objects and the increased abilities of an
avatar add to the sense of the virtual world's persistence. These
aspects also provide the players with goals for game-play.
14
C. Approaches to Property Rights in Virtual World Objects
As a result of the fact that virtual world objects are persistent and
most often rivalrous, markets for these virtual world objects have
blossomed and grown both as direct trade between players and as a
cottage industry. In addition to the in-world trade that is often
encouraged by the virtual world operators, trade of virtual world
objects also occurs outside of virtual worlds and involves the
exchange of real world currency. This latter type of trade is most
commonly referred to as real money transfer. Exchange of virtual
world objects for real money is so extensive that economists have
demonstrated that both the gross GNP and the per capita GNP of
some virtual worlds rival that of real world countries. 15
12. Habbo US, http://www.habbo.com/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
13. Club Penguin, http://www.clubpenguin.com/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
14. For a more extensive description of virtual worlds, see generally F. Gregory
Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2004) and Bryan
T. Camp, The Play's the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2007).
15. See Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Markets and
Society on the Cyberian Frontier (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Inst. for Econ. Research, Working
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Because of the value associated with virtual world objects and
because many virtual world operators dislike the practice of real
money transfers, disputes have arisen over this industry. In turn, these
disputes have given rise to the question of whether property rights
exist with respect to virtual world objects. 16
The first examination of virtual world property in the legal
academic arena came in a 2004 article by Professors F. Gregory
Lastowka and Dan Hunter entitled The Laws of the Virtual Worlds.17
Professors Lastowka and Hunter made the case that virtual world
property was not different from other recognized types of property in
a descriptive sense' 8 and that virtual world property could be justified
by several of the major normative theories typically used to justify
property rights.' 9 Within the analysis of the descriptive nature of
property, they argued first that the intangibility of virtual world
objects was not materially different from other intangible property
interests. 20 Second, they argued that the possible temporal limitations
placed upon virtual world property rights by the potentially ephemeral
nature of virtual world objects did not make virtual world property
descriptively different from other types of recognized property that
also had temporal limitations.2' In their normative analysis, they
argued that virtual world property could potentially be justified by
three prevalent normative theories: the utilitarian theory of
Bentham, 22 the labor theory of Locke, 23 and the personhood theory ofRadin.2 4
Paper No. 618, 2001), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=294828;
Mark Ward, Virtual Gaming Worlds Overtake Namibia, BBC NEWS, Aug. 19, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3570224.stm.
16. The question of whether property rights exist with respect to virtual world objects in
turn gives rise to another question - to whom such rights are initially allocated. This latter
question has been the subject of much less explicit discussion than the first question.
17. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 14, at 29-51.
18. Id. at 37-43.
19. Id. at43-50.
20. Id. at 40-42.
21. ld. at42-43.
22. Id. at 44-46.
23. Id. at 46-48.
24. Id. at 48-50. Lastowka and Hunter referred to this theory under its alternate name,
'personality theory'. I use the name 'personhood theory' here to be consistent with the rest of
this article. Additionally, Lastowka and Hunter attribute this theory, at least to some degree, to
Hegel. However, whether Hegel even had a theory of property is highly contested. I have
attributed the theory to Radin here both because it provides the reader with a proper view of how
the rest of this article relates to Lastowka and Hunter's work and because I believe Radin's work
was the primary source, along with Jeremy Waldron's work, for their discussion of this theory.
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Subsequently, in an article entitled Virtual Property, Professor
Joshua Fairfield has taken up the utilitarian justification of property
rights in virtual world objects and expanded upon it with a law and
economics justification.25 First, he points out that property rights are
generally granted in newly emerging resources in order to provide
incentive for their proper development and use.26 Then, he argues
that, largely due to the interdependent nature of virtual environments,
improper allocation of property rights in virtual environments can
27lead to an undesirable anticommons. In an anticommons,
overlapping property rights prevent anyone from making beneficial
use of the property thus reducing overall value.28 Property rights
should therefore be allocated in a manner that cuts across potential
conflicts and allows the use of the object to which the property rights
attach.29 Because virtual world objects define such a useable object,
they are the proper unit in virtual environments to which property
rights should be attached.30
Just as Professor Fairfield's article took up the utilitarian
argument in more detail, this article seeks to take up another of the
normative justifications raised by Lastowka and Hunter - the
personhood theory of Radin.
III. PROPERTY AND PERSONHOOD: RAD[N'S THEORY
In 1982, Professor Margaret Jane Radin published an essay
entitled Property and Personhood in which she initially introduced
her personhood theory of property.31 Later, the theory also came to be
referred to as the personality theory of property. At its core, the theory
seeks to elaborate "the notion that ownership is bound up with self-
constitution or personhood. ', 32 The theory posits that we can describe
25. Joshua A. T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047 (2005). Professor
Fairfield actually discusses virtual property beyond virtual world property.
26. Id. at 1065.
27. Id. at 1076.
28. Id. at 1069.
29. See id. at 1077-78. See also id at 1070 (describing the distinction between vertical
and horizontal property rights originally made by Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill HARV. L. REV. 621, 670
(1998)).
30. Id. at 1077-78.
31. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)
[hereinafter Radin, Personhood].
32. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 1 (1993) [hereinafter RADIN,
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY].
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two types of property or property relationships: 33 personal 34 and
fungible. 35 'Personal' property is that which has become bound up
with the individual, the loss of which would cause a level of loss
greater than the monetary value of the property.36 Classic examples
used by Radin are the home,37 wedding rings,3 8 and body parts.3 9
Fungible property is property that is perfectly replaceable,40 of which
the classic example is money.4' Despite describing this classification
as a dichotomy between personal and fungible property, Radin
acknowledges that property exists on a continuum between personal
and fungible.
My terms fungible and personal do not mark out a rigid binary
dichotomy but rather mark the end points of a continuum.
Nevertheless, the terms are useful. We understand certain
categories as corresponding to the continuum's end points, or as
close to it - we understand some categories of property items as
being completely interchangeable with others of their kind without
loss of value to the person (fungible), and some categories as being
bound up with the person so as to be of unique and nonmonetizable
value to the person (personal). 43
33. Radin initially used the term property, Radin, Personhood, supra note 31, at 957, but
later thought that property relationships would have been a preferable term. RADIN,
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 2. The later term, property relationships, is less
ambiguous in that it more accurately describes what is of interest - the rights between
individuals - as opposed to the thing or object to which the rights apply.
34. As Radin later acknowledges, the choice of the term 'personal' may not have been the
best choice because 'personal property' is already widely used to refer to something else -
personalty. She suggests that the term 'constitutive' would have been a better choice. RADIN,
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 2. However, because the academic literature
surrounding this theory largely uses her original terminology, I will use it herein.
35. Id. at2.
36. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Colin Ruagh Thomas 0'Fallon Memorial Lecture on
Reconsidering Personhood, 74 OR. L. REV. 423, 426 (1995) [hereinafter Radin, O'Fallon
Lecture] ("I use the term personal property to refer to categories of property that we understand
to be bound up with the self in a way that we understand as morally justifiable.").
37. Radin, Personhood, supra note 31, at 959.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 966. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849, 1856 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability].
40. Radin, O 'Fallon Lecture, supra note 36, at 426-27 ("I use the term fungible property
to refer to categories of property that we do not understand to be justifiably bound up with the
self, but rather understand to be separate from the self in the sense that they are not implicated in
self-constitution.").
41. Radin, Personhood, supra note 31, at 960.
42. Radin, O 'Fallon Lecture, supra note 36, at 427.
43. Id.
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However, most of her analysis and application of the personhood
theory assumes that the property in question is either personal or
fungible.4
Whether property is personal or fungible is not determined by
some characteristic of the thing, but rather by whether the thing and
the rights in it have become bound up with the individual. If we apply
the terminology of the classic subject/object dichotomy, then we
would say that property becomes personal when it becomes more
subject and less object, which is other to or outside of the
self/subject. 45
In human life as we know it, self-constitution can include
connectedness with things in the world; with a home, for example.
Not everything we might be thus connected with in the world can
be property, but some such things can be property. When an item
of property is involved with self-constitution in this way, it is no
longer wholly "outside" the self, in the world separate from the
person; but neither is it "wholly" inside the self, indistinguishable
from the attributes of the person. Thus certain categories of
property can bridge the gap, or blur the boundary, between the self
and the world, between what is inside and what is outside, between
what is subject and what is object. 46
On the other hand, many examples of property are not bound up
with the self and do not contribute to an individual's proper self-
constitution. Property that remains object is fungible.
Lots of things that people own have little to do with self-
constitution, however. People hold money not for its special
relationship to who they are but for what it can buy in the way of
other things. Many things that people own, such as items of
property held only for investment, are just like money in this
respect. Property items of this kind are understood as outside the
self, and they do not serve to blur the boundaries of the self or
subject.47
44. See generally RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32.
45. Radin identifies this blurring of the traditional subject/object dichotomy as a feature
of her pragmatist approach. RADN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 9:
Just as the blurring of the traditional distinction between empirical and normative
(fact and value) is a pragmatist project, so too is the blurring of the traditional
distinction between subject and object. My attempt to develop a view of property
and persons that blurs the subject/object distinction is therefore another
pragmatist aspect of my project.
46. Radin, O 'Fallon Lecture, supra note 36, at 426.
47. Id.
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Whether property is personal or fungible) depends not on what
type of thing it is, but rather on what an individual's relationship to
the property is. Thus, the same type of thing can be personal for one
individual and fungible for another. For example, a wedding ring may
be simple fungible property to the artisan who produced it48 and the
jeweler who sells it, because the artisan and jeweler hold the ring only
as property that can be exchanged for value. However, the very same
ring may become personal property when it becomes bound up with a
spouse's personhood, when it reaches a certain level of importance
relative to the spouse's self-constitution. 49 Similarly, a house or
apartment can be fungible property when held by a builder or
landlord, but may become personal property for one who dwells in the
house or apartment.
50
Radin draws philosophical inspiration from both Hegel and
Kant.5 ' In her initial work, Radin focused primarily on Hegel and his
view that a person has no concrete existence until that person
exercises his will on the outside world. She saw a parallel between
her personhood theory of morally-justifiable self-constituting property
and Hegel's idea that "[b]ecause the person ... is merely an abstract
48. Under various natural right theories about the relationship between personhood and
external objects, however, a ring thus crafted could be connected to its creator.
49. Radin, Personhood, supra note 3 1, at 959 ("For instance, if a wedding ring is stolen
from a jeweler, insurance proceeds can reimburse the jeweler, but if a wedding ring is stolen
from a loving wearer, the price of replacement will not restore the status quo - perhaps no
amount of money can do so.").
50. Id. at 960 ("Other examples are the wedding ring in the hands of the jeweler, the
automobile in the hands of the dealer, the land in the hands of the developer, or the apartment in
the hands of the commercial landlord."); id. at 992:
There is more to the rationale based on sanctity of the home; it contains a strand
of property for personhood. It is not just that liberty needs some sanctuary and
the home is a logical one to choose because of social consensus. There is also the
feeling that it would be an insult for the state to invade one's home because it is
the scene of one's history and future, one's life and growth. In other words, one
embodies or constitutes oneself there. The home is affirmatively part of
oneself-property for personhood-and not just the agreed-on locale for
protection from outside interference.
51. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 7:
My view that persons can be become bound up with external objects can be
related to Hegel, who argued in his Philosophy of Right that placing the will into
an object takes the person from abstract to actual. It can also be related to Kant,
who argued in his Rechtslehre that property was necessary to give full scope to
the free will of persons: they must have control over objects in order fully to
constitute themselves as persons.
See also Radin, Personhood, supra note 3 1, at 971-79; Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note
39, at 1891-98.
52. Radin, Personhood, supra note 3 1, at 972-73.
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unit of free will or autonomy, it has no concrete existence until that
will acts on the external world .... [T]he person becomes a real self
only by engaging in a property relationship with something
external., 53 Although Kant's view of a person as reducible to an
autonomous agent of free will and his view of the strict boundary
between subject and object5 4 appear at odds with Radin's theory,
Radin did find some level of coherence between her theory and
Kant's conclusion that "property must become a juridical (i.e.,
socially mediated) relationship precisely because it is crucial to the
full scope of the will of persons." 55 In later writings, Radin makes
clear that she was not intending to use Hegel (or Kant) as a theoretical
base for her theory; rather she was pointing out "certain resonances"
between their work and her theory.
5 6
The argument that some property is bound up with the self to the
point that it has become self-constitutive, that it has come to blur the
line between subject and object, is only part of Radin's analysis 7 In
addition to recognizing that connections can exist between a person
and property, Radin's theory also introduced a normative aspect that
asked whether such a connection between an individual and a
particular property should be recognized as personal-that is given
greater protection.5 8 Not all subjectively important connections to
property, therefore, are protected as personal under Radin's theory. In
addition to good object-relations, Radin also acknowledged that
individuals could also form bad object-relations, which she also
referred to as fetishistic connections. 59 So, under the theory's
normative aspect, not all strong connections between a person and
property should be recognized under and protected by her personhood
theory.
53. Id.
54. See Peter Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal
Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1351-57 (1996).
55. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 8.
56. Id. at 7 ("1 do no more than point out certain resonances between these texts and the
cultural/legal understanding I am trying to illuminate."); id. at 8 ("I did not mean to take Hegel
as a theoretical foundation for my view, but only as a suggestive text.").
57. Id. at 4-5.
58. Id.
59. Radin, Personhood, supra note 3 1, at 968-70 (Radin appears to borrow the term
'fetishism' from Marxist theories.). See also Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at
1871-74. Just as Radin drew inspiration from the philosophical work of Hegel and Kant when
describing the self-constitution of the person through property, Radin appears to draw some
amount of inspiration from Marx and later Marxist theorists for her distinction between person-
property relations (those that should be recognized as personal and those that should not.). Id.
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To determine when property had become important enough to an
individual's personhood and when that connection constituted good
object-relations which should be protected under the theory, Radin
initially said that we should look to an "objective moral consensus" of
what property relations contributed to "healthy self-constitution.,
60
During the years between the initial publication of the Property and
Personhood article, which introduced her theory, and the publication
of her book Reinterpreting Property, the linguistic formulation of this
test evolved.61 Because the term 'objective' seemed to contradict the
term 'consensus' and because the term 'objective' carried a great deal
of philosophical baggage that did not coincide with the pragmatic
meaning she intended, the term was not used in any formulations after
the initial article.62 Additionally, the term 'consensus' was dropped
because it gave too many readers the impression that what constituted
personal property could change as simple majority viewpoints
changed.63 Similarly, the term 'healthy' evolved into 'human
60. Radin, Personhood, supra note 31, at 969:
Because I seek a source of objective judgments about property for personhood,
but do not wish to rely on natural law or simple moral realism, consensus must be
a sufficient source of objective moral criteria-and I believe it can be,
sometimes, without destroying the meaning of objectivity. In the context of
property for personhood, then, a thing that someone claims to be bound up with
nevertheless should not be treated as personal vis-A-vis other people's claimed
rights and interests when there is an objective moral consensus that to be bound
up with that category of thing is inconsistent with personhood or healthy self-
constitution.
61. See RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 4 ("1 would put it
differently now, after some years of wrestling with pragmatist ideas.").
62. See id.
I would no longer use the word 'objectivity' so unselfconsciously. (Indeed,
'objectivity' does not appear in this unproblematized way in any essay after the
first.) It is not that the word is without meaning for the pragmatist. There are
indeed things that we experience as existing apart from us and outside our
control. But the word has too much baggage in the history of modern Western
thought. The baggage is essentialism, the kind of traditional philosophical
realism that the pragmatist denies.
63. See id at 4-5.
I would no longer use the word 'consensus' to describe the kind of strong
entrenchment of concepts like personhood in our culture and discourse.
("Consensus" does not appear in the essays written after "Property and
Personhood.") I was groping for a vocabulary in which to express the pragmatic
understanding of objectivity: shared understandings that are, for now, too
entrenched to be revisable by individuals, and are experienced by individuals as
coming from outside themselves. "Objective moral consensus" was a particularly
unfortunate phrase in which to try to express this entrenchment because the
foundationalist baggage attached to "objectivity" implied for most readers a kind
of transcendent reality divorced from the activities of human beings.
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flourishing' because ihe former invited too much confusion as to
whether one was to consider 'healthy' for its descriptive implications
or its normative implications.64
Instead, Radin said that, in making determinations about whether
particular self-constitutive property relations are good or bad, whether
they contribute to human flourishing or not, we should take an
approach inspired by philosophical pragmatism and look for moral
views with a "strong entrenchment.,
65
Not everything with which someone may subjectively identify
herself should be treated legally or morally as personal. Otherwise
the category of personal things might collapse into "consumer
surplus": anything to which someone attached high subjective
value would be personal. The question whether something is
personal has a normative aspect: whether identifying oneself with
something-constituting oneself in connection with that thing-is
justifiable. What makes identifying oneself with something
justifiable, in turn, is an appropriate connection to our conception
of human flourishing.
66
Importantly, Radin's theory is at first implicitly and later
consciously both pragmatic and nonideal.67 She appears to reject
conceptualism, the idea that there exists a particular concept of
Thus, "objectivity" seemed to contradict what was implied by "consensus,"
which has its own baggage having to do with groups of individuals entering into
a social contract. To most readers, "consensus" seemed to imply a naYve kind of
conventionalism. It seemed to suggest that normative understandings are
determined by taking a survey of people's views, or asking people to vote.
64. Id. at 5 ("1 would no longer make 'health' ('healthy self-constitution') the criterion by
which we distinguish good from bad property attachments .... I now think it will advance the
argument much better to speak directly about human flourishing, rather than health.").
65. Id. at 4. See also Radin, O'Fallon Lecture, supra note 36, at 427 ("These categories
of understanding are not transcendent but rather relate to cultural commitments.").
66. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1908.
67. Radin, O 'Fallon Lecture, supra note 36, at 425:
I now think my characterization of the main aspects of personhood ... owed
too much to past ideal theories about personhood. As a pragmatist, I believe
nonideal theory is also necessary. To be a bit more precise, I believe our visions
about the nature of human beings and the nature of the good life for human
beings cannot be too far divorced from the circumstances that give rise to those
visions, from what gives them their bite, their urgency. These circumstances
include an understanding that our life at present falls short of the good life for
human beings, as well as what we understand to be the specifics of its
deficiencies.
See also Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1915 ("In spite of our ideals, justice
under nonideal circumstances, pragmatic justice, consists in choosing the best alternative now
available to us.").
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property that is the right one or the only one, and formalism, the idea
that a particular property concept can be applied formally, that is to
say logically and mechanically. 68 Instead, "'pragmatism' suggests, if
nothing else, a focus on context and practice, as well as a drawing
back from grand theory. 69  As Radin herself has written,
"[p]ragmatism is essentially particularist, essentially context-bound
and holistic; each decision is an all-things-considered intuitive
weighing. Pragmatism is indeed 'essentially' ad hoc."'70 Therefore,
Radin does not offer any comprehensive theory on what contributes to
human flourishing. 7' As a result of taking a pragmatic approach that
borders on a positivist approach,72 Radin only describes particular
examples of property that when self-constitutive can further human
flourishing.73
Once property is found to be personal as opposed to merely
fungible, the rights associated with that personal property are
potentially altered. The personhood theory can be described as
affecting property rights in two ways.74 First, personal property is
given preferential treatment, that is to say personal property is favored
over fungible. 75 Thus, if an object has become incorporated into the
subject, in other words if it has become 'personal' property, then it
should be protected to the detriment of a fungible property interest
held by another; the interest in personal property should be favored
over fungible property. 76 The functioning of rent control statutes
68. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 100.
69. Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A )Critique of Radin's Theory of
Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REv. 347, 348 (1993).
70. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1680 (1988).
71. See Schnably, supra note 69, at 357; Margaret Jane Radin, Justice and the Market
Domain, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE 165, 188 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock, eds.,
1989) ("1 have no handy algorithm for making this decision."). See also Radin, Market-
Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1908 ("There is no algorithm or abstract formula to tell us
which items are (justifiably) personal.").
72. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 9 ("[T]he blurring of the
traditional distinction between empirical and normative (fact and value) is a pragmatist
project").
73. See Schnably, supra note 69, at 357.
74. See id. at 357-58.
75. Id.
76. Id.
[O]ne method is to favor personal over fungible property interests. For example,
the state may, in effect, give tenants permanent tenure on good behavior by
restricting the right of landlords to evict the tenants. Or the state may require a
shopping center owner to permit protestors to demonstrate on the premises. In
each case, the individuals with the personal interest (the tenants and the
2008]
730 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24
would be an example of this effect of the personhood theory of
property." A tenant's property right, which is personal, is protected to
the detriment of the landlord's property interest, which is considered
fungible. Second, the alienability of personal property may be
restricted.78 Property that is or that has become 'personal' property
may be market inalienable; in other words, that property should be
maintained in a non-commodified state.79 Something that is market
inalienable can be given away, but not sold.80 Radin applied her
theory in this way to sexual services, adoption markets, and surrogacy
services.8 '
IV. VIRTUAL PERSONHOOD: APPLYING RADIN'S THEORY TO
VIRTUAL WORLD PROPERTY
Having introduced the phenomena of virtual world property and
examined Radin's personhood theory of property, this Part will seek
to test the application of the latter to the former. This analysis will be
divided into two inquiries. The first inquiry will examine whether
virtual world property can be classified as personal within Radin's
82meaning of that term. The second inquiry will examine what
implications would follow from a determination that some virtual
world property qualifies as personal.83
A. Can Virtual World Property Be Personal?
The first question to address in applying Radin's personhood
theory to virtual world property is whether virtual world property can
be classified as personal within Radin's personal-fungible continuum.
The extent of the question being asked is better understood in light of
protestors) prevail over the individuals with the fungible property interest
(landlords and mall owners). Favoring a personal interest could also mean giving
it greater protection from state interference.
77. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
350 (1986) [hereinafter Radin, Rent Control].
78. See Schnably, supra note 69, at 357-58.
79. Id. at 358 ("A second technique for protecting a personal interest is to decommodify
it or make it market-inalienable, meaning that it can be given away but not sold. Our ideal of
human flourishing indicates that some attributes or property should not exist in a commodified
form at all").
80. Id. See also Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1853 ("This nonsalability
is what I refer to as market-inalienablity. In precluding sales but not gifts, market-inalienability
places some things outside the marketplace but not outside the realm of social intercourse.").
8. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1921-36.
82. See discussion infra Part IV. A.
83. See discussion infra Part IV. B.
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a few important qualifications. First, just as it was useful for Radin to
simplify her analysis by treating the continuum as a dichotomy, 84 it
will be useful here as well. In other words, we will be asking whether
virtual world property exists far enough along that continuum on the
personal end to be treated as fully personal rather than trying to
identify exactly where on the continuum virtual world property might
be. Second, just as Radin's theory does not attempt to classify all
property of a specific type as personal but instead attempts to
establish that some property of a specific type held in the right
manner can be classified as personal,85 so too will we seek to ask
whether some virtual world property can be considered personal
rather than fungible. In other words, Radin did not argue that all
wedding rings are always held as personal property; she argued that
some wedding rings, when held in a self-constitutive manner
conducive to human flourishing, were personal.86 Similarly, we are
not asking whether all virtual world objects are personal, but rather
whether some can be considered personal. Finally, the question does
not seek to prove generally the existence of property rights in all
virtual world objects. Radin's theory presumed the existence of
property rights in fungible property and did not seek to provide any
independent justification for those rights. 87 Her theory only sought to
identify and describe a special class of property - personal property.88
Similarly, we do not seek to provide an independent justification for
property rights in all virtual world objects; instead, we seek only to
ask whether some subclass of virtual world property should be treated
as personal property within Radin's meaning of that term.
Answering the question turns out to be highly problematic.
Radin acknowledges that there is no easy algorithm for determining
what property should be considered personal. 89 The theory appears to
ask first whether property has become so bound up with the self so as
to blur the boundary between subject and object 9 and then second
84. See Radin, Personhood, supra note 31, at 987.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 959-60.
.87. See id. at 986.
88. Radin's theory does not appear to be dependent upon the existence of a system of
fungible property rights except to the extent that it fashions rules that operate within an existing
system of broadly applicable fungible property rights. As we might expect from a pragmatic
approach, her theory merely observes a system of fungible property rights and then seeks to
work in reference to it. See generally RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32.
89. See, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
90. See Radin, Personhood, supra note 31, at 959.
2008]
732 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.i. [Vol. 24
whether such a connection is morally justifiable, that is whether such
a connection supports human flourishing. 91
As a starting point in determining whether virtual world property
can become bound up with the self, we might initially examine the
subjective value of virtual world property. That individuals place a
high subjective value on virtual world property is not too difficult of
an argument to make. Millions of people invest large amounts of both
time and money in obtaining and using virtual world property. 92 Some
studies suggest that regular players spend on average more than
twenty hours a week in virtual worlds. 93 Much of that time is spent
acquiring or improving virtual world objects; all of it is spent using
virtual world objects. 94 Some players spend hundreds or even
thousands of dollars to obtain highly desired virtual world objects.95
Further, in addition to placing high subjective value on virtual world
objects, individuals also appear to strongly identify with some virtual
world objects, particularly avatars. 96 While it is clear that most
players do not identify with their avatars in a way we would recognize
as meeting Radin's requirement-that the connection blur the line
between subject and object, it is quite likely that some players'
connections to their avatars do.97
However, holding high subjective value in and having strong
connection to some property are not sufficient to classify property as
personal.98 If it were sufficient, then the capitalist compleat would
hold his financial empire as personal property merely because he
valued it highly and he identified himself through it.99 In addition to
showing a self-constitutive connection to virtual world property, we
would also need to show that such a connection supported human
91. Id. at 961.
92. See JULIAN DIBBELL, PLAY MONEY: OR, How I QUIT MY DAY JOB AND MADE
MILLIONS TRADING VIRTUAL LOOT 12-14 (2006).
93. See, e.g., The Daedalus Project: The Psychology of MMORPG,
http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
94. See DIBBELL, supra note 92.
95. Id.
96. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 14, at 63-68.
97. Remember that we are not seeking to demonstrate that all virtual world property is
personal, only to demonstrate that some virtual world property can be personal. The percentage
of a particular type of virtual world property that is personal may impact what rules are adopted.
For example, if the percentage is sufficiently small, then we might not choose to protect the type
as a whole through market inalienability. But that concern is beyond the question we are asking
here.
98. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1908.
99. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1908.
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flourishing in order to be justifiably classified as personal property.' 00
To define human flourishing and what supports it, we would look to
strongly entrenched moral views. 10 ' This is where an attempt to
demonstrate that virtual world property can be classified as personal
becomes particularly problematic. While we might begin to consider
the extent to which potentially personal virtual world property
enhances to the somewhat fuzzy concept of human flourishing, the
mixture of positivist and normative approaches in Radin's
pragmatism leaves us with little guidance in novel situations such as
virtual worlds.
In initially examining whether a view that personal connection to
virtual world property is conducive to human flourishing is strongly
entrenched in our moral system, we might start by looking at the
common or popular view of virtual worlds and of the individuals who
invest large amounts of time within them. Much of the coverage of
virtual worlds in the press and in popular media is of a sensationalized
nature. While the successful business side of virtual worlds gets some
news coverage, particularly in technology oriented news outlets,
negative stories about virtual worlds seem to get more widespread
news coverage; mainstream news outlets cover virtual worlds when
one player murders another player in real life because that player stole
a virtual world object from the murdering player,'0 2 or when an
individual dies in real life because he was playing in a virtual world
for several straight days.'0 3 In popular media such as television shows,
we see more of the same. Shows such as Law & Order: SVU, 0 4 CSI:
New York, 05 NCIS,10 6 and NUNMB3RS 10 7 have all aired episodes in
which some individual who is portrayed as having become overly
involved in a virtual world either kills himself or someone else
100. Id.
101. See RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 4-5.
102. See, e.g., 'Game Theft' led to fatal attack, BBC NEWS, Mar. 31, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4397159.stm.
103. See, e.g., Choe Sang-Hun, Hooked on the virtual world A reality in South Korea,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 12, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/
2006/06/1 /business/addsidel 2.php; Stanley A. Miller 11, Death of a Game Addict, J. SENTINEL,
Mar. 31, 2002, http://www.jsonline.com/story/ index.aspx?id=31536; Carmen lvanov, Two
Fanatic World of Warcraft Gainers Have Died Because Of WoW - Are there more to come?,
SOFTPEDIA, Nov. 8, 2005, http://news.softpedia.com/news/Two-Fanatic-World-of-Warctaft-
Gamers-Have-Died-Becouse-Of-WoW- 11821 .shtml.
104. Law & Order: Special Victims Unit: Game (NBC television broadcast Feb. 8, 2005).
105. CSI: New York: Down the Rabbit Hole (CBS television broadcast Oct. 24, 2007).
106. NCIS: The Immortals (CBS television broadcast Oct.14, 2003).
107. NUMB3RS: Primacy (CBS television broadcast Nov. 9, 2007).
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because of the over involvement with the virtual world. The treatment
of virtual worlds in mainstream news and popular media is very
reminiscent of the hysteria with which fantasy role-playing games
such as Dungeons & Dragons were treated in the late 1970's and
early 1980's. 108 It also has a flavor of the concern with virtual reality
in the early 1990's - that users of virtual reality would ignore the real
world in favor of spending all of their time in virtual reality to the
detriment of both themselves and the real world. Notably, most of
these examples of treatment in news coverage and popular media do
at least implicitly stress a high level of connection between the
individual and the virtual world object, most commonly an avatar.
They portray a high degree of blurring between an individual's self
and avatar, between the real world and the virtual world. However,
that connection and that blurring are portrayed as highly negative.
While I have little doubt that few people would want the
mainstream news and popular media industry to be the final arbiters
of our society's moral views, that industry is adept at reading its
targeted audience. Therefore their negative portrayal of virtual worlds
nonetheless has value as an indicator even if we would not accept it as
proof. Further, even though it may be weak as evidence of our moral
views, it is evidence that contradicts what we would need to classify
virtual world property as personal, and thus, however weak, it moves
us farther from demonstrating that virtual world property can be
considered personal. What we would need and what we do not
observe is evidence of the protection of virtual world property
because of some strongly entrenched feeling that it should be given
greater protection. That is not to say that virtual worlds and virtual
world property is not beneficial to human flourishing or that they will
not someday become recognized as so, but rather that they are not so
recognized now.
Recall that Radin's personhood theory is, particularly in this
step, a combination of positivist and normative approaches.'0 9 It is not
a theory that attempts to derive an entire system of property rights
from a starting principle; it does not attempt to explain all aspects of
property. The theory is pragmatic in nature and is a mixture of
108. See, e.g., MAZES AND MONSTERS (McDermott Productions 1982) (a Tom Hanks
movie about a college student who comes to confuse a fantasy role-playing game with reality);
Wikipedia, Mazes and Monsters, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mazes-and-monsters (as of Mar.
15, 2008, 15:56 GMT).
109. See RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 9 (describing pragmatism
as a combination of empirical and normative approaches). See also Radin, Personhood, supra
note 31, at 958.
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positivist and normative approaches. The theory is therefore more
useful, at least more easily applicable, the more it relies on its
positivist aspect. That is to say, the more the underlying normative
result in a particular circumstance is agreed upon, the better it works,
the more acceptable its application. Radin derives her theory from
observations of what appears to her to be certain types of property
that are fairly consistently given greater protection, such as the home
for example.1" ° This is the positivist aspect of her theory and her
pragmatic approach. In novel contexts, such as that presented by
virtual worlds, the positivist aspect of her theory is not able to bolster
the normative inquiry; observation of virtual worlds is unlikely to
reveal any strongly entrenched moral views relating to specifics of
virtual world property.
Additionally, the criticism that existing and new rules have a
recursive effect on any consensus or strong entrenchment on what
constitutes personhood may become more relevant. Radin's early
description of the normative step of determining if the connection to
property should be recognized as personal relied on reference to an
objective moral consensus." This drew criticism related to potential
feedback effects. First, any consensus of what constituted good
property relations could change over time, and second, granting
higher protection to a type of property could in turn affect that
consensus.112 Thus, the criticism went, the recognition of property as
personal under Radin's theory could influence the consensus about
what should be protected, creating an opposite causal relationship
from what Radin intended. 13 Even though Radin has sought to move
away from a standard as mutable as one based on consensus,' 14 her
newer formulation of the normative measure, a strong moral
entrenchment' , is likely to be susceptible to the same criticism, even
if to a lesser degree. Susceptibility to this criticism is even more acute
with respect to novel contexts, such as virtual worlds. While
recognition of property as personal may have only a small recursive
effect on a strong moral entrenchment that pre-exists that recognition,
the effect may be much greater in novel contexts, such as virtual
worlds, in which strong entrenchments do not yet exist.
110. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
112. See generally Schnably, supra note 69, at 362-75.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, we would be less concerned with being led astray
by any effects from feedback in established contexts than we would
be in novel contexts. With established rules and contexts, the home
for example, Radin's mixed positivist and normative approach still
seems likely to yield a beneficial result in the view of a pragmatist
even if there is some feedback between recognizing property as
personal and the strong moral entrenchment about that property
deserving protection as personal property. We feel more confident
that the strongly entrenched moral conviction has value and less
worried about any negative effects arising out of potential feedback
from personhood-based rules back onto the entrenchment because we
have long standing experience with established rules and contexts.
But can we say the same for situations in which the rules and contexts
are new? In these novel situations, we do not have established
normative ground to build upon. There is likely no moral view yet
strongly entrenched in these novel situations. Without better
normative guidance, guidance that is less dependant upon a positivist
approach, we seem less likely to reach an initial beneficial result, or at
least less likely able to even judge the desirability of the result. The
positivist approach does not work to identify our "normative" basis.
We can extrapolate from other situations and contexts, but the more
novel the situation, the less certain we can be. The threat of feedback
becomes more urgent; the rule can largely generate the strong
entrenchment rather than the other way around.
B. Potential Implications of Finding Virtual World Property
Personal
As discussed above, a finding that property is personal under
Radin's personhood theory can affect property rights in two ways.
First, personal property can be given preferential treatment relative to
fungible property, and second, personal property may have restricted
alienability. 16 Thus, if virtual world property is found to be personal
as defined by Radin's personhood theory,' 17 the rights associated with
virtual world property might be affected in both of these ways.
Therefore, virtual world property rights might be favored over
116. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
117. Even though the previous section concluded that it was difficult to demonstrate that
virtual world property could be considered personal, see discussion supra Part IVA, this section
assumes that virtual world property is personal for the purpose of examining the implications of
such a conclusion.
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competing fungible property rights, and the alienability of virtual
world property might be restricted.
1. Disputes Between Players and Virtual World Operators
Favoring players' personal property rights in virtual world
objects over the fungible property rights of virtual world operators
might be one effect of determining that virtual world property is
personal. 118 Radin's personhood theory could thereby provide support
for a player in a dispute with an operator of a virtual world. One of
the results of granting greater protection to personal property rights
under Radin's theory is that where one individual's rights in personal
property conflict with another individual's rights in fungible property,
the former rights are favored. This remains true for situations in
which two individuals have rights in the same property. If one
individual's property interest is personal, while the other's is fungible,
the former should prevail under the personhood theory, or at the very
least, the former should be favored. Therefore, if the player's property
interest is personal and the virtual world operator's property interest is
fungible, Radin's personhood theory would favor the player's interest
over the virtual world operator's interest.
This effect is highly analogous to the application of the
personhood theory to justification of rent control statutes.119 In the
rent control context, both the tenant and the landlord hold an interest
in the relevant property, the residential rental unit. Yet, rent control
statutes protect the property rights of tenants to the detriment of the
property rights of landlords. Radin's theory of property for
personhood provides support for these statutes.' 20 Since the residential
rental unit is the tenant's home, it will often be considered personal
under Radin's theory.' 2' In contrast, the interest of the landlord will
almost always be considered fungible; it is in other words merely an
118. This assumes the most likely scenario that the players' interests are personal and the
virtual world operators' interests are fungible. That is of course not the only possible scenario.
Virtual world operators could theoretically be so deeply connected to their world that their rights
could be considered personal if a strong moral entrenchment supported that such a connection
furthered human flourishing. However, it seems more likely, relatively speaking, that players'
interests would be considered personal while virtual world operators' interests would be
considered fungible.
119. The putative effect of making a determination that virtual world property is personal
is analogous; this discussion is not intended to argue that virtual world property is analogous to
rental units as homes with respect to whether virtual world property can be considered personal.
120. See Radin, Rent Control, supra note 76, at 350-52.
121. Id. at 350.
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investment that is fuilly replaceable by equal monetary value.1
22
Therefore, the tenant's property right should be favored over the
landlord's property right because the former is personal and the latter
is fungible. 123 The player's property rights in virtual world objects are
analogous to the tenant's property rights while the virtual world
operator's property rights are analogous to the landlord's property
rights. Because the two sets of rights are interdependent, protecting
one can be detrimental to the other. The application of the personhood
theory would conceivably do just that. As personal property rights,
the player's property rights would be favored over the virtual world
operator's fungible property rights just as a tenant's personal property
rights in the tenancy would be favored over the landlord's underlying
fungible property rights.
In exercising control of virtual worlds, virtual world operators
can in the exercise of their own rights impinge upon the property
rights of players in virtual world objects. One example would be
nerfing. The practice of nerfing refers to the virtual world operators'
reduction of a virtual world object's capabilities after it has been
distributed. When a virtual world operator uses their control over the
virtual world to reduce the in-world capabilities of a particular type of
object, the player's property rights in that object are arguably
impacted. Another example would be the practice of resetting virtual
worlds to a previous point in time. Essentially, virtual world operators
can reset the virtual world to an earlier point in time. This is generally
done either in an attempt to correct some systemic problem or as a
response to a technical problem. When reset, everything in the virtual
world basically jumps back to where and how it was at an earlier
point. This can potentially impact a player's property rights by
removing from the player virtual world objects and avatar-based
abilities obtained prior to the reset and subsequent to the point in time
to which the world is reset. A more dramatic example would be the
simple banning of a player. If the virtual world operators ban a player
from the virtual world by terminating the player's account access,
then the player is effectively stripped of all virtual property right the
player might have had. One final example would be virtual world
operators shutting down a virtual world entirely. Virtual world
operators can simply stop operating the world; the virtual world
ceases to be. When that happens, players would lose all access to any
virtual property.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Each of these is an example of the fungible property rights of the
virtual world operators trumping the potentially personal property
rights of players. However, Radin's personhood theory seeks the
opposite result. Thus, in each case, the theory's application might
result in a legal rule preventing the relevant action by the virtual
world operators. The question then becomes when the personhood
theory will intervene and mandate a legal rule that produces a
different result, a result favoring the personal property right of the
player.
The personhood theory of property does not completely protect
personal property under all circumstances. When the theory mandates
such protection is not enunciated particularly clearly. This is another
area in which the theory's positivist aspect males its application to
novel circumstances problematic. The analogy to the theory's
application to the justification for rent control statutes may be helpful.
Through rent control statutes, landlords are prevented from raising
rent beyond a proscribed amount for a tenant, who is presumed to
have a personal property interest in their rented home. Landlords are
also blocked from simply evicting the tenant in order to charge a
subsequent tenant greater rent. Landlords are, however, permitted to
evict the tenant based on the bad conduct of the tenant. The limitation
on the landlord appears then to relate to the reasons for the landlord's
exercise of their fungible property rights and landlord's concomitant
interference with the tenant's personal property rights. If the
landlord's actions are for pure economic gain, then the interference
with the tenant's personal right may not be permitted. The landlord
can neither raise the tenant's rent nor evict the tenant in order to lease
to a subsequent tenant at a higher rental rate just because the rental
market might bear it. The landlord is not allowed to exercise her
fungible property rights to extract greater rents because it would
impact the tenant's personal property rights. Instead, under the
explanation of rent control statutes provided by Radin's personhood
theory of property, the landlord's rights yield to the tenant's rights.
One possible explanation for when the landlord's fungible rights
should yield to the tenant's personal rights is that the fungible rights
should yield when the fungible right is being exercised only for
economic gain. Thus, a landlord cannot act against a tenant's personal
property rights just for economic gain but can act against that
personal right because of the bad behavior of the tenant.
If we apply this interpretation to our virtual world examples,
then we see that applying the personhood theory to virtual world
property may not affect the outcome in many of the examples. Neither
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nerfing nor resetting are generally done simply to extract more value
from players. Instead, they are typically done to correct either some
problem with the design of the virtual world or some problem of a
technical nature within the world. If a player is denied access to the
virtual world and his virtual world property because he has behaved
badly and has therefore been banned, then the virtual world operator
is not acting to extract more value from that player. So, even if
players had property rights in virtual world objects and those rights
were considered personal under Radin's theory, the theory would not
mandate a legal rule in these instances to produce a different result.
In other examples, however, the theory might mandate a
different result. If a player is denied access to the virtual world simply
because the player is unable to pay the increased fees demanded by
the virtual world operators for access, then favoring personal property
rights over fungible property rights might produce a rule preventing
the virtual world operators from raising fees in such a manner.
124
Similarly, if virtual world operators shut down a virtual world only to
manipulate the market in favor of a new virtual world they are
producing and to extract thereby additional value, then the
personhood theory might block such a move by virtual world
operators.
Once we identify the possible effects of applying the personhood
theory to virtual world property, we see that the possible criticisms of
such an application are also analogous to the criticisms levied against
rent control. Rent control statutes have been criticized as actually
exacerbating the problem they were nominally supposed to address:
rental housing shortages.125 Price-theory analysis states that limiting
the amount of rent a landlord can charge to an amount lower than
what the market will bear will decrease the incentive for landlords
both to use current buildings for residential rental purposes and to
construct new residential apartment buildings. 2 6 As a result, price-
theory suggests, rent control statutes will actually increase the
shortage of rental housing.127 Criticisms brought against virtual
property generally, criticisms that would likely be even more heavily
levied against the effects of the personhood theory described above,
parallel the criticisms leveled against rent control by price-theory. The
124. Such fee inflation is purely hypothetical. Fee inflation analogous to the level of rent
inflation that leads to rent control has not been observed.
125. See Radin, Rent Control, supra note 77, at 350-52.
126. Id. at 350.
127. Id.
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criticism of recognizing virtual property rights is that recognizing
such rights places restrictions on what virtual world operators can do
and thereby gives rise to potential liability on the part of virtual world
operators. 128 This reduces incentives to create and operate virtual
worlds, which in turn reduces opportunities for players to participate
in greater numbers and varieties of virtual worlds. 129 Thus, if virtual
property rights reduced access to virtual worlds and if virtual property
rights supported human flourishing, a conclusion necessary to
recognition of virtual world property as personal, then the application
of the personhood theory to virtual world property could be self-
defeating by actually reducing the opportunities for human
flourishing.
2. The Alienability of Virtual World Property
The second way in which recognizing virtual property rights as
personal under Radin's personhood theory might affect virtual
property relates to the right of alienability. Under Radin's theory,
highly personal property130 may have partially or completely
restricted alienability.13' Specifically, it may be market inalienable; in
other words, it may be given away but not sold. 32 It is maintained in a
non-commoditized state. 133 Thus, if virtual world property is found to
be personal, then the personhood theory may mandate that virtual
world property be maintained in a completely or partially non-
commoditized state.1
34
Interestingly, making virtual world property market inalienable
is a result that stands in direct opposition to the result initially sought
by players claiming property rights in virtual world objects. Those
players sought the legal ability to sell virtual world property. Thus,
the real money transfer controversy that originally raised the issue of
property rights in virtual world objects asked if players have the right
to alienate virtual world objects in a market. Most of the virtual world
128. Richard Bartle, Pitfalls of Virtual Property, THEMIS GROUP, 2004, at 9,
http://www.themis-group.com/uploads/Pitfalls%20of/ 20Virtual%20Property.pdf.
129. Id.
130. Some things may be so highly personal that referring to them as property at all may
be harmful to personhood. Thus, Radin later adopted the use of terms such as 'attributes' to
describe the highly personal. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1885.
131. See generally Radin, Market Inalienability, supra note 39.
132. Id. at 1850.
133. Id. at 1855.
134. For the sake of simplicity, I will not hereafter distinguish between partial non-
commodification and complete non-commodification.
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property debate has therefore focused, perhaps without reflection, on
the commodification of virtual world objects and on the allocation of
that commodity. Even if it is unfair to say that the debate has focused
on these issues, the debate has certainly taken place very much in the
shadow of these issues.
Radin's personhood theory, however, deals primarily with
making property non-commoditized, that is to say market inalienable.
While Radin's theory provides support for allocation of some rights to
players,135 it does not provide support for rights of alienation that
would create an entitlement to real money transfer. Commodification
and market alienability, necessary prerequisites to rights of alienation
that enable real money transfer, are antithetical to personal property
under the personhood theory. Commodification is an aspect of
fungible property not personal property. The application of the
personhood theory would not, therefore, provide support for players
seeking the right to sell virtual world property.
While Radin's personhood theory certainly seems to presume the
existence of fungible property rights, it leaves the justification for
fungible rights to other theories. 136 Radin's theory is not one that
seeks to determine and justify the entire scope of property rights with
respect to all possible objects of property right. Rather, her theory
seeks to explain and justify the enhanced set of rights given to objects
with certain characteristics, namely objects that have become
important to healthy self-constitution and human flourishing. 137 The
fact that Radin's theory would not provide a justification for the
existence of alienability rights in virtual world property does not
necessitate a conclusion that such rights do not exist and should not
be recognized.
Instead of providing support for rights to alienate virtual world
property, the personhood theory could have the opposite effect and
might make virtual world property market inalienable. If virtual world
property is recognized as personal, then legal rules preventing its sale
might be developed. Permitting the sale of virtual world property that
has become personal property would be considered harmful under
Radin's theory for two primary reasons. The first reason is related to
the possibility of market coercion.' 38 Separation of personal property
from the individual through coercion harms the person because
135. See discussion supra Part V. B. 1.
136. See generally RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 32.
137. Id.
138. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 40, at 1879-87, 1910-12.
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personal property has become part of the self in a manner that
enhances human flourishing.' 39 Coerced sale is therefore detrimental
to the individual's ability to flourish as a person. In order to prevent
the possibility of sales of virtual world property due to market
coercion, sale is prohibited. The second reason is related to the
negative effects of market rhetoric. 140 The sale by some converts
virtual world property from subject to object and through the rhetoric
of alienation devalues virtual world property for all. 141 Conceiving
and speaking of virtual world property as a fungible commodity
would harm individuals because thinking of personal property as
something that can be separated from the person without harm acts to
separate it from the individual. As Radin said, "Rhetoric is not just
shaped by, but shapes, reality."'
142
An examination of both reasons in an attempt to determine if
virtual world property is so personal as to necessitate non-
commodification reveals that while neither reason provides much
support for non-commodification, the second reason may provide
somewhat stronger support than the first, even if only relatively. The
first reason, protection against market-coerced sale, provides little
support for making virtual world property market inalienable. Unlike
the contexts in which Radin applied this reasoning, the virtual world
context lacks any compelling stories of market coercion. There are no
stories analogous to the stories of women forced to act as surrogates
by extreme poverty or of individuals forced to sell a kidney to provide
food for themselves and their families. The closest the virtual world
context comes to providing such stories are the early stories of click-
sweat shops. The positive difference between the market value of
virtual world property in countries such as the United States and the
hourly pay rate in less developed countries led many commentators to
postulate the existence of click-sweat shops in which workers would
be paid very low wages to play virtual world games. The virtual
world property thus obtained would then be sold for a profit. While
the existence of such 'gold farming' businesses, as they are now
called, is confirmed, they are not generally thought of equivalent to
sweat shops. Regardless of whether they are click-sweat shops, the
story does not provide evidence of the relevant effect of market
coercion, because such players-as-workers are obtaining virtual world
139. See generally id.
140. See id
141. See id. at 1880-81, 1912.
142. Id. at 1870.
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property only for the purpose of later sale. Thus the players-as-
workers are not being forced to part with personal property, only
fungible property. This lack of compelling stories makes the need for
a ban on sale of virtual world property much more difficult to
envision, let alone justify.
While the second reason may provide more support for non-
commodification of virtual world property when compared to the
first, its application in the virtual world context does not compare well
to the examples related to this reason provided by Radin. Almost as
soon as some players wanted to sell virtual world property, there were
players who fervently opposed the buying and selling of virtual world
property. Although there are many possible explanations for players'
objections to the sale of virtual world property, one possibility is that
these players found that the sale of virtual world property by others
somehow lessened what they had. This could be an example of the
type of harm that Radin describes as being caused by market
rhetoric. 143 However, that the sale of virtual world property by others
caused these players to feel less connected in a beneficial way to their
virtual world property is only one of many possible explanations for
their objections. Additionally, the sale of virtual world property does
not intuitively equate to the examples used by Radin to describe the
negative effects of market rhetoric. The primary example used by
Radin of a context in which market rhetoric is harmful is that of
bodily integrity, in particular rape. 144 On an intuitive level, the
potential harm caused by market rhetoric used in the context of virtual
world property does not equate to the harm caused by using market
rhetoric to describe rape.
Virtual world property might in the future become so integral
and important to individuals and their personhood as to justify non-
commodification under Radin's theory; however, there appears to be
little to support non-commodification presently. The objections of
many players to the buying and selling of virtual world property
might possibly relate to the negative effects of market rhetoric when
applied to personal property, but it is far from the only explanation for
those objections. It is therefore difficult to demonstrate that virtual
world property is so personal as to justify using Radin's personhood
theory to place virtual world property in a non-commodified state.
143. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1880.
144. Id. at 1879-81.
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V. CONCLUSION - THE BIGGER PICTURE
The attempted application of Radin's personhood theory to
virtual world property provides a far from perfect fit. First, Radin's
pragmatic approach produces a standard for identifying personal
property that is largely positivist in nature. 45 This in turn creates
difficulty when we attempt to apply the theory to novel areas such as
virtual worlds. Their novelty makes it difficult to identify any
strongly entrenched moral views regarding virtual world property and
its relation to an individual's ability to flourish. Second, the
application of her theory to virtual world property, assuming that such
property is personal, seems to produce few helpful rules, although this
may be because of the difficulty of envisioning virtual world property
as comparable on the personal-fungible continuum as the persuasive
examples given by Radin herself. Thus, the difficulty may not be so
much in envisioning what rules would be mandated by a finding that
virtual world property is personal, but rather the difficulty in
accepting those rules as desirable on an intuitive level arises because
virtual world property does not appear to us to be as personal as many
of the examples used by Radin.
The inquiry, however, should not be abandoned. Our relatively
narrow inquiry into the potential application of Radin's personhood
theory of property to virtual world property may provide insight into
broader questions, broader both in theoretical and contextual senses.
Radin's theory is just one example of many possible theories about
supporting individuals as persons, and virtual worlds are just one
example of many contexts in which computer-mediated technology is
presenting challenges to individuals as persons.
On the theory side, there may well be areas of further inquiry
within and around Radin's theory that will be fruitful. For example,
one such area in which we might continue to look relates to the
interaction between Radin's theory and autonomy. While a theory
such as Radin's that is based so heavily on ideas of self-constitution
might at first glance be expected to be in harmony with notions of
autonomy, it largely is not. 46 Most notably, Radin's emphasis on
145. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
146. See Radin, O 'Fallon Lecture, supra note 36, at 431-32.
In my work on property and personhood so far, I have focused on one aspect of
the dialectic of contextuality: the need for context stability. I have largely ignored
the other aspect of the dialectic of contextuality, the need for context flexibility. I
thus have run the risk of being understood as promoting a too-thick theory of
personhood. You can say I have stressed connectedness, at the expense of the
possibility of disconnection.
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market inalienability is very much at odds with traditional notions of
autonomy. 47 But, it is in that middle ground between Radin's market
inalienability and traditional liberal notions of autonomy where many
relations between individuals, including perhaps relations defined by
virtual world property, seem to reside.148 Further exploration of this
middle ground in which the protection of personhood and the
protection of autonomy need to be reconciled may therefore be useful
in defining how virtual world property should be treated. Conversely,
further examination of virtual world property may be useful in finding
a way to reconcile Radin's personhood theories and traditional
theories of autonomy.
On the context side, maintaining this discussion is important
because the potential application of Radin's theory of personhood to
virtual world property is a part of a larger discussion about the role of
individuals in a society increasingly mediated by technology. More
Like feminists who feel it is worthwhile to run the risk of undue stress on
personal contextuality at the expense of personal autonomy, I felt it was
worthwhile to run the risk of being misunderstood as promoting a too-thick
theory of personhood, in order to provide an antidote to a too-thin theory of
personhood that is dominant in traditional liberalism. Traditional liberal theory
leans too far toward alienability, commensurability and commodification.
Maybe the antidote is no longer needed, or no longer worth the risk (if ever it
was). I hope that future work on property and personhood will be less one-sided.
It should try to achieve a better understanding of the nature of the paradoxical
coexistence of the two aspects of contextuality in self-constitution, both in theory
and in practice.
147. Radin departs from the traditional view of autonomy for two reasons. First, she
appears to view the market as inherently coercive. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying
text. Thus, making property that is highly 'personal' market inalienable, which protects the
individual from the loss of that property and the concomitant loss to their personhood that would
result from losing the property that has become so closely bound up with their personhood. Id.
While some might not need protection from the market's coercive effects and while some might
hold the same type of property as fungible property, Radin argues that in some situations the
loss of autonomy these individuals may suffer in making some types of property market
inalienable is outweighed by the value to personhood gained by others who would be subjected
by loss to market coercion. Id.
Second, Radin argues that allowing for commodification of a certain type of property
would lead to a use of rhetoric of alienation that would be harmful to personhood object-
relations even in the absence of any market coercion. See supra notes 141-142 and
accompanying text. The sale by some converts the property from subject to object, and through
the rhetoric of alienation devalues the type of property for all. Id. This is linked to, or explains,
the objections of many players to the sale of avatars and virtual world objects.
148. In terms of Radin's personhood theory, this middle ground might be understood as
being at neither end of the personal-fungible continuum. Thus, property in this area might not be
personal enough to receive the highest level of protection - market inalienability, but might be
personal enough to receive some degree of greater protection.
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and more of the activities of individuals are moving online into
computer-mediated space. At the same time, more and more of the
physical world is becoming computer-mediated.
Virtual worlds can be thought of as the ultimate embodiment of a
computer-mediated world. As virtual worlds exist completely within a
system of computers, every aspect within those worlds is computer-
mediated. Examining the individual as an avatar in what could be
fairly characterized as the most highly computer-mediated
environment currently existing may provide insight into how a future
of increasing computer mediation will impact individuals. Increasing
computer mediation of human activity provides increasing
possibilities of interference with an individual's ability to act and thus
with an individual's ability to self-constitute themselves.149 Thus
continuing to examine how Radin's theory of personhood might apply
in the virtual world context may provide insight into how the
technology of increasing computer-mediation may affect individuals
in broader contexts. While Radin's theory is only one possible theory
addressing the needs of individuals as persons and while the theory
only addresses a subset of human relations - property - it does
provide an in-road into issues likely to be of increasing importance in
an increasingly computer mediated world.
149. Here, we see a further reason why reconciling theories of personhood and autonomy
may be important. Traditional notions of autonomy and liberty provide little protection in novel
computer-mediated contexts. Because traditional liberal theories of autonomy focus on
protecting the individual from interference by the state, they provide little help in dealing with
computer-mediated interactions in which it is private actors, not the state, that are interfering
with the individual.
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